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FINALLY, CRACK SENTENCING REFORM: WHY IT
SHOULD BE RETROACTIVE
1. INTRODUCTION
In a recent House Judiciary Subcommittee hearing, U.S. District Judge Spencer
Letts recalled a sentencing held in his courtroom echoing a source of injustice
reoccurring for nearly two decades.1 Twenty-seven year old Johnny Patillo, a regularly
employed college graduate, agreed to deliver a package to a Federal Express for his
neighbor for payment of 500 dollars.2 Patillo admitted he was aware the package
contained drugs; however, he was uncertain of what kind of drugs and the amount. 3 The
package contained nearly 680 grams of crack cocaine, 4 automatically triggering the
imposition of a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence.5 Judge Letts noted Patillo lacked
any prior criminal activity and recognized Patillo was simply trying to earn a couple
extra bucks during a tough financial time.6 However, the harsh statute required
application of the mandatory minimum sentence regardless of the unique circumstances
of the case.7 Patillo, an employed college graduate, participated in behavior that was "out
of character" and surprising to family and friends who stated "this [was] the first time
[the] defendant [had] been in any kind of trouble." 8 Nevertheless, without meeting
Patillo, Congress thoughtlessly stripped him of ten years of his life. 9 This policy does not
ensure fairness. 10
Concern about crack cocaine gained national attention in the summer of 1986
when the media and public reacted to the University of Maryland basketball legend Len
Bias's alleged overdose on crack cocaine. 11 However, his death was later attributed to
1. See Unfairness In Federal Cocaine Sentencing: Is It Time to Crack the 100 to 1 Disparity? Hearing on
H.R. 1466, H.R. 265, H.R. 2178, and H.R. 18 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec.,
H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 121-23 (2009) [hereinafter Unfairness In Federal Cocaine
Sentencing] (statement of J. Spencer Letts, United States District J. for the Central District of Cal.).
2. United States v. Patillo, 817 F. Supp. 839, 840 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
3. Id.
4. In this comment, "crack cocaine" refers to cocaine base, and "powder cocaine" refers to cocaine
hydrochloride.
5. Patillo, 817 F. Supp. at 840.
6. Id. at 840, 845.
7. See Unfairness In Federal Cocaine Sentencing, supra note 1, at 123 (statement of J. Spencer Letts,
United States District J. for the Central District of Cal.).
8. Patillo, 817 F. Supp. at 845.
9. Id. at 843-44.
10. See Unfairness In Federal Cocaine Sentencing, supra note 1, at 121-22 (statement of J. Spencer Letts,
United States District J. for the Central District of Cal.) (explaining the "unreasonable" and "unconstitutional"
effects that the unfair crack-to-powder sentencing disparity causes in federal courts).
11. Julie Stewart, Well Done Congress, Now Make Fair Sentencing Act Retroactive, THE HUFFINGTON
PosT (Aug. 4, 2010, 5:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/julie-stewart/well-done-congress-now-
ma b 671008.html; DEBORAH J. VAGINS & JESSELYN MCCURDY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CRACKS IN
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powder cocaine.12 Congress became panic-stricken and quickly reacted to a supposed
crack cocaine epidemic that was sure to sweep the nation. 13 Without thoroughly
examining the supposed trend,14 Congress instead based its legislative determinations on
now proven faulty statistics of the drug's effects, addictiveness, and its correlation with
violence. 15 Congress established a sentencing scheme providing for punishment much
more extreme, unfair, and unsuccessful than most politicians anticipated.16 The resulting
legislation, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 ("Anti-Drug Act"), 17 created statutory
provisions punishing crack cocaine trafficking 1 8 100 times harsher than powder cocaine
trafficking. 19  This sentencing scheme came "under almost universal criticism from
representatives of the Judiciary, criminal justice practitioners, academics, and
community interest groups."20 After more than two decades of sentencing in this
manner, Congress finally came to its senses and reduced the disparity in federal
sentencing between crack cocaine and powder cocaine.21 Ideally, defendants now face
sentencing according to their requisite culpability, not strictly according to the form of
cocaine and the quantity in their possession.22
President Obama signed the Fair Sentencing Act ("Fair Act") on August 3, 2010,
greatly lessening the punishment defendants faced for so long.23 This modification of the
previous law represents Congress's realization that it made a mistake in drafting the
THE SYSTEM: TWENTY YEARS OF THE UNJUST FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE LAW, at i (2006), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/drugpolicy/cracksinsystem 20061025.pdf.
12. See, e.g., Carol A. Brook, Mukasey Puts Latest Crack in Truth on Drugs, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 7, 2008),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-03-07/news/0803060576 1 crack-cases-bias-death-sentences; Michael
Weinreb, The Day Innocence Died, ESPN.coM (Sept. 15, 2009, 8:29 PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/eticket/story?page-bias.
13. Stewart, supra note 11.
14. Id.
15. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY
8, 31-36, 62-69 (2007), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative and Public Affairs/Congressional Testimony andReports/Drug Topics/20
0705 RtC Cocaine SentencingPolicy.pdf [hereinafter USSC 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS] (analyzing in
depth federal sentencing data discussing violence, weapon involvement, and offender characteristics as well as
cocaine's structure, effects, and addictiveness). See generally VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 11 (discussing
the crack and cocaine sentencing disparity and addressing the many discriminatory effects of the drug law).
16. See Unfairness In Federal Cocaine Sentencing, supra note 1, at 99 (testimony of Marc Mauer,
Executive Director, The Sentencing Project).
17. Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.
18. For the purposes of the article, the term "trafficking" means "with intent to distribute." The term
"simple possession" means "without intent to distribute."
19. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE SENTENCING 1-2 (2009) (on file with author)
[hereinafter FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE SENTENCING] ("[D]efendants convicted with just five grams of crack
cocaine . . . are subject to a five-year mandatory minimum sentence. The same five-year penalty is triggered for
the sale of powder cocaine only when an offense involves 500 grams, 100 times the minimum quantity for
crack . . . . Similarly, while the sale of 5,000 grams of powder . .. subjects defendants to a 10-year sentence, the
same mandatory sentence is triggered by selling only 50 grams of crack.").
20. USSC 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 15, at 2 (citing apps. B & C).
21. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) (reducing the cocaine
sentencing disparity by amending provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1), and eliminating the mandatory
minimum for simple possession required by 21 U.S.C. § 844).
22. See discussion infra Part Ill(A).
23. Fair Sentencing Act §§ 2-3 (reducing the disparity between crack and powder cocaine from the previous
100-1 ratio to an 18-1 ratio, increasing the quantities that trigger the mandatory minimums from 5 to 28 grams
for the 5-year mandatory minimum, and from 50 to 280 grams for the 10-year mandatory minimum. The law
also eliminated the 5-year mandatory minimum for simple possession of crack cocaine).
746 Vol. 47:3
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previous legislation.24 On its face, the Fair Act does not include a specific provision
expressing Congress's intent that the legislation apply retroactively. 2 5 Thus, the updated
law might not apply to defendants with pending prosecutions under the previous law or
defendants serving time under the previous unforgiving penalties. 26
The Fair Act, which represents an intelligent and just change in federal cocaine
sentencing, clearly indicates the impropriety of the former sentencing policy.27 The Fair
Act drastically reduces the disparity in federal sentencing between powder cocaine and
crack cocaine, alters the possession amount that triggers the mandatory minimums and
abolishes the mandatory minimum for first time simple possession of crack. This Act
should retroactively apply to defendants pending sentencing and defendants previously
sentenced under the more stringent sentencing laws, as they both deserve to benefit from
this fairer legislation that better assigns punishment according to the appropriate level of
culpability. This comment will discuss the history and misconceptions behind federal
cocaine sentencing and its effects on the U.S. criminal justice system.28 In addition, this
comment will address the new law and the rationale concerning its retroactive
application.29
I. BACKGROUND
A. Early Days of Federal Crack Cocaine Sentencing Laws
In June of 1982, the Reagan Administration launched a war on drugs using the
threat of crack cocaine as a platform.30 By 1986, the spotlight shone brightly on the new
trend of crack cocaine usage. 3 1 Thousands of media reports, not based on scientific
evidence, claimed that crack cocaine was a deadly and addictive drug that caused health
problems, led to an increase in crime and violence, and destroyed families.32 This
"deluge" of news reports about the drug, combined with the political pressures of an
upcoming election, demanded Congress's attention. 33 Congress addressed the issue by
racing through the legislative process and failing to fully research before legislating.34
24. See People v. Oliver, 134 N.E.2d 197, 202 (N.Y. 1956) ("A legislative mitigation of the penalty for a
particular crime represents a legislative judgment that the lesser penalty or the different treatment is sufficient
to meet the legitimate ends of the criminal law.").
25. See generally Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).
26. Id.
27. See Press Release, Patrick Leahy, U. S. Sen. for Vt, Comment of Senator Leahy On Final Passage of
The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (July 28, 2010), available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press-releases/release/?id=33bcO905-1642-4238-bIaO-a61c313e2fdc.
28. See discussion infra part II.
29. See discussion infra part Ill.
30. Alyssa L. Beaver, Comment, Getting A Fix On Cocaine Sentencing Policy: Reforming the Sentencing
Scheme of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2531, 2544 (2010).
31. Id. at 2538-39.
32. John P. Morgan & Lynn Zimmer, The Social Pharmacology of Smokeable Cocaine: Not All It's
Cracked Up To Be, in CRACK IN AMERICA: DEMON DRUG, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 134-35 (Craig Reinarman &
Harry G. Levine eds., 1997).
33. See David H. Angeli, A "Second Look" at Crack Cocaine Sentencing Policies: One More Try for
Federal Equal Protection, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1211, 1212 (1997).
34. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING
POLICY 116 (1995), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative and Public Affairs/Congressional Testimonyand Reports/DrugTopics/19
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The result was the Anti-Drug Act, 3 5 forming the origin of the disparity in crack cocaine
sentencing that existed until 2010.36 Through this disparity, Congress allegedly
attempted pursuance and punishment of "major drug traffickers more severely than low-
level [retail] dealers." 37 The law introduced the 100-1 crack cocaine and powder cocaine
disparity, requiring the possession and trafficking of 100 times the amount of powder
cocaine to receive the equivalent punishment for possession and trafficking of crack
cocaine.38 The difference in punishment was due in part to the unsupported beliefs and
claims that crack was more dangerous, had a stronger link with violence and guns, and
was more addicting than powder cocaine. 39 Thus, five and ten-year mandatory minimum
sentences governed crack cocaine offenses depending on the quantity a defendant
possessed. 40
Unfortunately, Congress's attempt to resolve the alleged threat of crack cocaine led
to its passing a bill without thorough investigation. 4 1 Varied drafts of the bill circulated
so quickly that Congress members had trouble ascertaining what provisions were
actually in the bill.42 Congress amended the bill43 that eventually became law more than
100 times.44 The legislative process, deemed "rush[ed]," 4 5 did not impart a clear
indication of the rationale behind the 100-1 sentencing disparity.46 Enactment of a law
based on sound policy requires an extensive understanding of the topic; including
debates, hearings, and committee meetings. 47 Furthermore, the legislative record should
9502 RtC Cocaine SentencingPolicy/chap5-8.pdf [hereinafter USSC 1995 REPORT TO CONGRESS].
35. Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.
36. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 95-96 (2007). "Congress apparently adopted the 100-to-I
ratio because it believed that crack, a relatively new drug in 1986, was significantly more dangerous than
powder [cocaine]." Id. at 86 (citing to the case syllabus).
37. Id. at 98.
38. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY
4-5 (2002), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative and Public Affairs/Congressional Testimonyand Reports/DrugTopics/20
0205 RtC Cocaine Sentencing Policy/200205 Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy.pdf [hereinafter
USSC 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS] ("[A]s a result of the 1986 Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) requires a five-year
mandatory minimum penalty for a first-time trafficking offense involving five grams or more of crack cocaine,
or 500 grams or more of powder cocaine, and a ten-year mandatory minimum penalty for a first-time
trafficking offense involving 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, or 5,000 grams or more of powder cocaine.
Because it takes 100 times more powder cocaine than crack cocaine to trigger the same mandatory minimum
penalty, this penalty structure is commonly referred to as the " 00-to-I drug quantity ratio.").
39. Unfairness In Federal Cocaine Sentencing, supra note 1, at 114-15 (statement of Senior J. Arthur L.
Burnett Sr., National Executive Director, National African American Drug Policy Coalition, Inc.).
40. Anti-Drug Abuse Act § 1002.
41. See United States v. Peterson, 143 F. Supp. 2d 569, 572 (E.D. Va. 2001) (explaining "during the Senate
floor debate on the 1986 Act, several senators commented that the bill was hastily prepared, rather than the
product of a deliberative process, and was not enacted through the traditional committee procedure").
42. 132 CONG. REC. 26, 462 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1986) (Statement Sen. Charles Mathias) ("You cannot
quite get a hold of what is going to be in the bill at any given moment.").
43. HR. 5484, 99th Cong. (1986), as amended by S. 2878, 99th Cong. (1986), was signed into law on
October 27, 1986.
44. USSC 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 38, at 6 n.20 (discussing H.R. 5484, 99th Cong. (1986)
"while under consideration from September 10, 1986 to October 27, 1986.").
45. 132 CONG. REC. 26, 434 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. Bob Dole) ("I have been reading
editorials saying we are rushing a judgment on the drug bill and I think to some extent they are probably
correct.").
46. USSC 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 38, at 7; VAGTNS & MCCURDY, supra note 11, at 2
(describing the lack of Congressional record involved in the passage of the harsh crack cocaine laws).
47. See GOVERNMENT 101: How a Bill Becomes Law, PROJECT VOTE SMART, http:/
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clearly indicate the congressional intent and purposes behind the legislation as courts
typically use the record to ascertain the meanings and reasoning behind particular
statutory provisions. 48
In addition, the United States Sentencing Commission 49 ("USSC") promulgated
mandatory sentencing guidelines 5 0 for federal judges at the time the Anti-Drug Act went
into effect.51 Subsequently, the USSC integrated the 100-1 crack-to-powder ratio into the
mandatory sentencing guidelines.52 The USSC used the 100-1 crack-to-powder ratio to
determine sentences for every possession amount above and below the mandatory
minimums put in place by Congress. 53 By integrating the 100-1 ratio into the sentencing
guidelines, the USSC adopted Congress's harsh sentencing scheme and applied it to
every crack sentence, regardless of possession amount. 54 With the USSC's adoption of
the policy, the new framework resulted in numerical offense levels that corresponded
with sentencing ranges much higher for crack cocaine offenders than powder cocaine
offenders.55
Congress put the icing on the cake when it passed additional legislation directed at
crack cocaine possession in 1988.56 This new law required a five-year mandatory
minimum sentence for first offense simple possession57 of five grams or more of crack
cocaine.58 This legislation represented the only federal law of its kind creating a
mandatory minimum punishment for a first time offender for simply possessing a drug. 59
Conversely, a first time possession offense of powder cocaine, or any other controlled
http://www.votesmart.org/education/how-a-bill-becomes-law (last visited Oct. 8, 2010).
48. See United States v. Union Pac. R. Co., 91 U.S. 72, 79 (1875) ("But courts, in construing a statute, may
with propriety recur to the history of the times when it was passed; and this is frequently necessary, in order to
ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of particlar [sic] provisions in it.") (citation omitted).
49. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMN, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,
available at http://www.ussc.gov/About the Commission/Overview of the USSC/USSC Overview.pdf
("The United States Sentencing Commission is an independent agency in the judicial branch of government. Its
principal purposes are: (1) to establish sentencing policies and practices for the federal courts, including
guidelines to be consulted regarding the appropriate form and severity of punishment for offenders convicted of
federal crimes; (2) to advise and assist Congress and the executive branch in the development of effective and
efficient crime policy; and (3) to collect, analyze, research, and distribute a broad array of information on
federal crime and sentencing issues, serving as an information resource for Congress, the executive branch, the
courts, criminal justice practitioners, the academic community, and the public.").
50. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 991(b)(1)(B), 98 Star. 2017, 2018. This
provision of the federal sentencing statute essentially made the federal guidelines mandatory or binding on
federal courts during a criminal sentencing.
51. USSC 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 15, at 3.
52. Id. (discussing the integration of the 100-1 ratio into the federal sentencing guidelines).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. (discussing how the 100-1 drug quantity ratio can cause three to over six times greater punishment
for crack versus powder cocaine).
56. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4370.
57. Again, for the purposes of this article, "simple possession" refers to an offense in which the defendant
had no intent to distribute the controlled substance.
58. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4370 (1988).
59. USSC 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 38, at 11 (stating that possession of any other controlled
substance (other than crack cocaine) by a first time offender is a misdemeanor that carries a maximum
punishment of one year in prison. "In other words, pursuant to the 1988 Act, an offender who simply possesses
five grams of crack cocaine receives the same five-year mandatory minimum penalty as a serious trafficker of
other drugs.").
2012 749
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substance, carried a maximum punishment of one year in prison.60
From 1995 to 2007, the USSC issued extensive and detailed reports dispelling
many of the assumptions and beliefs concerning crack cocaine and urged Congress to
reduce the 100-1 sentencing disparity.61 The USSC reports expressed that the 100-1 drug
quantity ratio was "disproportionate" considering the "relative harms" between crack and
powder cocaine, and advocated appropriate adjustment.62 In addition, the reports stated
that the harsh 100-1 crack-to-powder ratio unfairly punished low-level offenders,
especially African Americans. 63 Although the federal statutory scheme remained in
place, "[d]evelopments in state criminal justice systems provided further evidence for the
Commission's finding that the 100-to-i ratio that controlled federal sentencing was
,44
unjustifiable. In the 1995 report, the USSC proposed amending the federal sentencing
guidelines to create comparable penalties for crack and powder cocaine.65 However,
Congress rejected the amendments, demonstrating an intent not to punish crack any less
severely than the current guidelines.66 The 1997, 2002, and 2007 USSC reports
continued to examine the crack and powder cocaine disparity and introduced alternatives
to the sentencing scheme in place at the time.67 For example, the USSC recommended
equalizing the mandatory minimum penalties for first time simple possession of crack
cocaine and powder cocaine68 and adopting a "three-pronged" approach to federal
sentencing.69 In response, Congress ignored the recommendations in the reports.7 0
B. The Amendment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Crack Cocaine
Finally, in 2007, the USSC took matters into its own hands and drafted an
amendment 71 to its sentencing guidelines that "reduce[d] the base offense level [in the
60. Id.
61. See generally USSC 1995 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 34; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (1997), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative and Public Affairs/Congressional Testimonyand Reports/DrugTopics/19
970429 RtC Cocaine Sentencing Policy.PDF [hereinafter USSC 1997 REPORT TO CONGRESS]; USSC 2002
REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 38; USSC 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 15.
62. Steven L. Chanenson & Douglas A. Berman, Federal Cocaine Sentencing in Transition, 19 FED.
SENTG REP. 291, 292 (2007).
63. Id.
64. United States v. Peterson, 143 F. Supp. 2d 569, 577 (E.D. Va. 2001).
65. See United States v. Fonts, 95 F.3d 372, 374 (5th Cir. 1996).
66. Id. (describing Pub. L. No 104-38, § 1, 109 Stat. 334 (1995) which "rejected the Sentencing
Commission's proposed 1:1 ratio on October 30, 1995, and refused to change the disparity between crack
cocaine and powder cocaine offenses.").
67. USSC 1997 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 61, at 9; USSC 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note
38, at 90-112; USSC 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 15, at 6-9.
68. Id.
69. USSC 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 38, at 104 (explaining the three pronged approach: "(1)
increase the five-year mandatory minimum threshold quantity for crack cocaine offenses to at least 25 grams
(and the ten-year threshold quantity to at least 250 grams); (2) provide direction for more appropriate
sentencing enhancements within the guidelines' structure that target the most serious drug offenders (without
regard to the drug involved) for more severe penalties; and (3) maintain the current mandatory minimum
threshold quantities for powder cocaine offenses.").
70. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 99 (2007). "Congress took no action after the Commission's
1997 and 2002 reports recommended changing the ratio." Id at 86 (citing to the case syllabus).
71. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. to app. C Amendments to the Guidelines Manual 221-
27 (2008) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL].
750 Vol. 47:3
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sentencing guidelines] associated with each quantity of crack by two levels." 72 The
USSC predicted the amendment would subtract nearly fifteen months from a crack
cocaine sentence. 73 While the amendment would not reduce crack cocaine sentences
governed by mandatory minimums, the USSC described the amendment as a "partial
remedy" for the problems generated by the crack/powder disparity. 74 Following a six-
month congressional review period in which Congress did not object to the proposed
amendment, it came into effect. 75 While the USSC amendment to the sentencing
guidelines only lessened sentences for crack possession amounts that did not trigger
mandatory minimums, it demonstrated the USSC's continuous attempt to persuade
Congress to alter the mandatory minimums.76 In 2008, the USSC further proved its
commitment to reducing the sentencing disparity when it unanimously77 voted for
retroactive application of the crack amendment thereby reducing sentences for
qualified defendants incarcerated under the previous guidelines. 79 The USSC estimated
the retroactive reduction in the base offense level could effectively reduce sentence
lengths for eligible incarcerated defendants by up to twenty-seven months. 80 From 2008
to 2010, federal courts granted over 16,000 prisoners' motions for a reduced sentence
under the retroactive crack cocaine amendment.8 1 The Chair of the USSC, Ricardo H.
Hinojosa, "received more than 33,000 pieces of public comment regarding the issue of
retroactivity" during the Commission's deliberation period. 82
While the 2007 crack amendment attempted further reduction of the disparity in
punishment compared to powder cocaine, thus providing relief to those behind bars, the
amendment comes with complications. 83 The Department of Justice ("DOJ") took the
position that the retroactive amendment would burden the judicial system by "diverting
significant prosecutorial resources" in the predicted re-sentencing of nearly 20,000
72. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 100.
73. FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE SENTENCING, supra note 19, at 7.
74. USSC 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 15, at 10.
75. News Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Votes Unanimously to Apply
Amendment Retroactively for Crack Cocaine Offenses (Dec. 11, 2007), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative and Public Affairs/Newsroom/Press Releases/20071211 Press Release.htm
[hereinafter News Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n].
76. See USSC 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 15, at 2 (stating "[i]t is the Commission's firm
desire that this report will facilitate prompt and appropriate legislative action by Congress.").
77. News Release, U.S Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 75.
78. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 71, at 247.
79. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, PRELIMINARY CRACK COCAINE RETROACTIVITY DATA REPORT 2 (2010),
available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Data and Statistics/Federal Sentencing Statistics/Crack Cocaine Amendment/2010101
3 USSCCrack CocaineRetroactivityData Report.pdf [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DATA REPORT]
("Commission voted to promulgate Amendment 713, which added Amendment 706 as amended by 711, to the
amendments listed in subsection (c) [sic] in §IB1.10 that apply retroactively. The Commission voted to make
Amendment 713 effective on March 3, 2008. As a result, some incarcerated offenders are eligible to receive a
reduction in their sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) pursuant to Amendment 706.").
80. Memorandum from Glenn Schmitt et al. to the Honorable Ricardo Hinojosa, Analysis of the Impact of
the Crack Cocaine Amendment if Made Retroactive 23 (Oct. 3, 2007) (on file with author).
81. PRELIMINARY DATA REPORT, supra note 79, tbl. 1.
82. U.S. Sentencing Commission, Public Meeting Minutes 6 (Dec. 11, 2007), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative and Public Affairs/Public Hearings and Meetings/20071211/20071211_Mi
nutes.pdf.
83. See sources cited infra notes 84-87.
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defendants.84 In light of this burden, the DOJ believed strongly that attorneys would not
have enough time and resources to prosecute current cases.85 Further, it believed the
retroactive application would overwhelm judicial districts with a large amount of re-
sentencings for incarcerated crack defendants.86 In addition, when the USSC amended
the guidelines in 2007, it included many limitations on a particular defendant's eligibility
to apply for a reduced sentence.87 Although there are numerous obstacles to ending the
sentencing disparity, the retroactive crack amendment represented a historical
disassociation with the past injustices of federal cocaine sentencing. 88
C. The Truth About Crack Cocaine Versus Powder Cocaine
As the USSC indicated in four extensive reports to Congress, the media based
much of the crack cocaine hype on scientifically inaccurate research.89 Additional
studies proved the disparity in punishment between crack and powder cocaine resulted in
"low-level retail" crack cocaine dealers and users receiving much harsher punishments
than high-end large quantity powder cocaine dealers.90 This disparity resulted in the
imprisonment of addicted crack users and "[twenty-two] times more convictions among
African Americans than whites." 9 1 Although the majority of the population that uses
crack is white or Hispanic, over eighty percent crack cocaine offenses in 2006 involved
African Americans.92 The effects of crack cocaine's pervasiveness resulted in a
devastating impact on the African American community. 93 African American defendants
sentenced for crack cocaine offenses flooded the prison system, as the drug plagued the
community more than "any other single cause since Jim Crow." 94 Three of the persistent
issues concerning the controversy between crack and powder cocaine include the
presumed greater addictiveness and harmfulness of crack, the presumed violence
correlated with crack, and the belief that prenatal exposure will lead to "crack babies." 95
Regarding the addictiveness of crack, regardless of whether the drug enters the
body in the form of crack base or powder cocaine, studies suggest the behavioral effects
84. Letter from Alice Fisher, Assistant Att'y Gen., to the Honorable Ricardo Hinojosa, Chair, U.S.
Sentencing Commission 1-2 (Nov. 1, 2007) (on file with author).
85. See id. at 2.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § BL.10(b)(2)(B) (2008) (stating "[i]f the original
term of imprisonment imposed was less than the term of imprisonment provided by the guideline range
applicable to the defendant at the time of sentencing, a reduction comparably less than the amended guideline
range [during resentencing] ... may be appropriate.").
88. See discussion supra Part 11 (A) and (B).
89. See discussion infra Part 11 (C).
90. Dorothy K. Hatsukami & Marian W. Fischman, Crack Cocaine And Cocaine Hydrochloride: Are The
Differences Myth Or Reality?, 276 JAMA 1580, 1580 (1996).
91. Id. at 1581.
92. Press Release, John Conyers, Chairman U.S. House Judiciary Comm., Conyers Applauds Reforming
the Uniust Crack-Cocaine Sentencing Disparity (July 28, 2010) (on file with author).
93. See STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE EcoNOMIST EXPLORES THE
HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 113 (1st ed. 2005).
94. Id.
95. Federal Cocaine Sentencing Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs, 107th Cong.
142, 149-51 (2002) [hereinafter Murphy Statement] (statement of The Honorable Diana E. Murphy, Chair,
United States Sentencing Commission); USSC 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 38, at v-viii; VAGINS &
MCCURDY, supra note 11, at 5.
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on the body are the same. 96 Statistical evidence reveals that most young people do not
continue using crack cocaine after initially trying it. 97 Those that do continue using crack
do not use it on a daily basis.98 Many crack cocaine users developed the habit because of
previous powder cocaine abuse. 99 The sentencing disparity troubles doctors, finding
crack and powder cocaine pharmacologically10 0 the same, and further concluding the
differences lie in the accessibility, price range, and "cultural environment and social
context" in which the different drug types are associated. 101 Findings prove that both
forms of the drug are "powerful stimulants" that cause indistinguishable effects. 102
Evidence shows that cocaine is cocaine, regardless of how it is broken down. 103 The
important consideration is that the type or form of the cocaine is immaterial. 104 The
crucial factor is how the substance is administered into the body.105 For instance,
chewing tobacco and smoking tobacco, two different products comprised of the same
base ingredient, produce similar effects on the body. 106 However, there are minor
differences that uniquely result from the particular way a person introduces the substance
into the body, similar to crack versus powder cocaine. 107 Both crack and powder cocaine
may cause similar addictions.108 However, the defining difference is the method in
which the two drugs are administered into the bloodstream, as that affects the rapidity of
the onset of the drug and the duration of the high. 109 The inhalation method, or smoking,
is the favored method as it rapidly affects the user and results in the "highest peak blood
levels." 110 Crack cocaine is considered more addictive because usage typically involves
96. Hatsukami & Fischman, supra note 90, at 1582-86 (explaining "regardless of whether cocaine is
administered as hydrochloride or base, both its rate of elimination and its metabolic profile are similar." Further
concluding "behavioral effects are a result of the parent compound regardless of the form in which the cocaine
was ingested or the route of administration.").
97. Morgan & Zimmer, supra note 32, at 144 (citing a 1991 National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA)
survey given to high school seniors).
98. Id.
99. Hatsukami & Fischman, supra note 90, at 1586.
100. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1694 (3d ed. 2002) (defining pharmacology
as: "l. the science of drugs including their origin, composition, pharmacokinetics, therapeutic use, and
toxicology; 2. the properties and reactions of drugs especially with relation to their therapeutic value.").
101. Hatsukami & Fischman, supra note 90, at 1586.
102. USSC 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 38, at 16.
103. Hatsukami & Fischman, supra note 90, at 1580; VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 11, at 5.
104. See Federal Cocaine Sentencing Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs, 107th
Cong. 168-69 (2002) [hereinafter Schuster Testimony] (testimony of Mr. Charles Schuster, Professor
Psychiatry and Behavioral Neurosciences, Wayne State University, and former Director, National Institute on
Drug Abuse).
105. Id.
106. See Making the Decision to Quit Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES,
http://health.nytimes.com/health/guides/specialtopic/smoking-and-smokeless-tobacco/overview.html (last
visited Oct. 5, 2010).
107. Hatsukami & Fischman, supra note 90, at 1580.
108. USSC 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 38, at 19 ("It is this difference in typical methods of
administration [e.g. smoking, inijecting, snorting, etc.], not differences in the inherent properties of the two
forms of the drugs, that makes crack cocaine more potentially addictive to typical users. Smoking crack
cocaine produces quicker onset of, shorter-lasting, and more intense effects than snorting powder cocaine.
These factors in turn result in a greater likelihood that the user will administer the drug more frequently to
sustain these shorter "highs" and develop an addiction.").
109. Id.
110. Testimony, Glen R. Hanson , Acting Director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), to the
U.S. Sentencing Commission, Commission Public Hearing (Feb. 25, 2002).
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smoking, a more addictive administration method. I11
The former Director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse ("Director") further
expanded on the varying leads of addictiveness, noting the physiological and
psychoactive effects of smoked crack or injected powder cocaine are similar and the
effect on the brain is identical.112 In addition, the Director noted prolonged use of
cocaine potentially produces "paranoid toxic psychosis" which might lead to behavior
that is considered "aggressive"; however, the same symptoms apply regardless of the
form of cocaine.1 13 In recommending a departure from the 100-1 sentencing ratio to a 3-
1 ratio, the Director reasoned that although the two forms of cocaine share similar risks
and effects, the ease of procurement of crack cocaine and the dangers associated with its
repeated smoking is a great enough concern to warrant a slightly stronger punishment. 114
However, punishing crack cocaine 100 times harsher than powder cocaine is certainly
not a slight variation in punishment.1 15
Secondly, the statistically incorrect belief that crack cocaine usage contributed to
an increase in violence also presumably justified the 100-1 sentencing ratio.116
Criminologists predicted that crack cocaine would contribute to a "bloodbath."1 17
However, the crime rate and occurrence of violence began to decrease and the
predictions of crack cocaine's dangerousness failed to transpire.1 8 Researchers defined
three distinct groups of drug-related violence to explain the relationship of drugs and
violence: violence induced from drug usage, violence induced by the need or want for
more drugs, and violence induced by involvement in the drug culture.119 Although a
general relationship between drugs and crime may exist, it is extremely difficult to say
that one drug in particular, such as crack, leads to more violence. 120
Studies continue to suggest that crack cocaine does not cause a person to behave
more violently as a result of the drug's pharmacological effect.121 In 2000, a report on
weapon use demonstrated 82.4% of powder cocaine offenses involved no weapon use,
slightly higher than the 74.5% in crack cocaine cases.122 In a 2005 report on violence
involved in crack and powder cocaine offenses, 93.8% of powder cocaine offenses
involved no violence compared to 89.6% of crack cocaine.123 Proving the violence myth
an exaggeration, the 2005 report also found that for both crack cocaine and powder
111. See Schuster Testimony, supra note 104.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
116. See Murphy Statement, supra note 95, at 149; VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 11, at 5.
117. LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 93, at 114.
118. Id.; see USSC 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 15, at 36-37 (describing the decrease of
violence).
119. Paul J. Goldstein et al., Crack and Homicides in New York City: A Case Study in the Epidemiology of
Violence, in CRACK IN AMERICA: DEMON DRUG, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 115-16.
120. See Testimony, supra note 110 (further explaining "[t]here appears to be no one single drugs-crime
relationship.")
121. Morgan & Zimmer, supra note 32, at 137-38 (explaining that people that use cocaine, who are not
already predisposed to violent behavior, do not suddenly have an urge to act violent).
122. USSC 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 38, at 54; VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 11, at 5.
123. USSC 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 15, at 38.
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cocaine, "threats" were the most documented form of violence.124 Many people
incorrectly assume violence associated with crack cocaine involves "some bug-eyed
crackhead shooting a shopkeeper over a few dollars." 12 5 Conversely, violence attributed
to crack cocaine generally involves disputes between drug dealers and rival gang
members.126 One inner city study found that a vast amount of drug and crack cocaine
related homicides resulted from the dangerous and "illicit" drug trade in general.127 The
market for all illegal drugs is "inherently violent."l28 Singling out one specific type of
drug and claiming it leads to more violence is unsound. 129 Furthermore, the "aggressive"
marketing of crack cocaine took place in predominantly poor neighborhoods already
predisposed to violence. 13 0 Harsher crack cocaine sentencing based on the chemical
composition of the drug and its presumed link with violence troubles Dr. Alfred
Blumstein. 13 1 Blumstein, an experienced criminology and operations researcher at
Carnegie Mellon University, recommends the particular violent behavior itself dictate the
punishment, not the composition of the drug.1 32 According to the USSC, there is no
authoritative justification to implicate crack cocaine with systemic crime.133
Lastly, the idea that a mother's prenatal exposure to crack leads to the development
of "crack baby syndrome" further motivated the crack cocaine sentencing scheme. 134
The effects of prenatal crack cocaine exposure on fetal development are identical to
powder cocaine. 13 5 In assessing the negative effects of prenatal exposure to cocaine,
researchers concluded the effects are much less harmful than originally thought. 136 Other
factors such as exposure to "tobacco, marijuana, or alcohol, and the quality of the child's
environment" help to explain the prenatal effects once originally attributed solely to
cocaine.137 Doctors analyzing prenatal cocaine exposure found no compelling evidence
to support the conclusion that prenatal exposure leads to "toxic effects that are different
in severity, scope, or kind from sequelae of multiple other risk factors."l38 Dr. Deborah
Frank, who researched prenatal cocaine exposure for over a decade, concluded that the
negative effects of prenatal powder or crack cocaine exposure are similar to tobacco, not
associated with increased birth defects and drug withdrawal syndrome, and are not
124. Id.
125. LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 93, at 134.
126. Id.
127. Goldstein et al., supra note 119, at 116-18; VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 11, at 5.
128. VAGINS & McCURDY, supra note 11, at 5.
129. See id.
130. Testimony, Dr. Alfred Blumstein, H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management, National
Consortium on Violence Research ("NCOVR"), Carnegie Mellon University, to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, Sentencing Guidelines for Crack and Powder Cocaine 5 (Feb. 21, 2002).
131. Id. at 2.
132. Id. at 5-6
133. USSC 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 38, at 102.
134. Murphy Statement, supra note 95, at 150-51; VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 11, at 5.
135. Murphy Statement, supra note 95, at 150-51
136. USSC 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 38, at 21.
137. Deborah A. Frank, Marilyn Augustyn & Wanda Grant Knight et al., Growth, Development, and
Behavior in Early Childhood Following Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: A Systematic Review, 285 JAMA 1613,
1624 (2001).
138. Id. at 1613.
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connected with Sudden Infant Death Syndrome.1 39  Interestingly, Dr. Frank used the
term "crack/cocaine" since researchers have no physiologic indicators that can verify
which form of the drug, crack cocaine or powder cocaine, the mother prenatally exposed
to the newborn. 140 She concluded the "crack baby" was a "grotesque media stereotype,
not a scientific diagnosis." 14 1 Furthermore, doctors lack the ability to differentiate
between babies prenatally exposed to powder cocaine or crack, and babies that are
not.142 Therefore, because virtually no difference exists between prenatal exposure to
crack versus powder cocaine, the sentencing disparity is unjustified based on this
rationale. 143
D. How Federal Courts Have Reacted to the Sentencing Disparity
Between the federal sentencing guidelines the USSC enacted in 1984, made
binding on federal courts, and the harsh mandatory minimums Congress statutorily
enacted in 1986 and 1988, courts had minimal discretion concerning the cocaine
sentencing process. 14 4 Federal sentencing developed into a "web of rules" due to the
culmination of the sentencing guidelines "level of factual detail" and the USSC's
"quantification of the value of sentencing facts." 1 4 5 Hundreds of judges challenged the
validity of mandatory federal sentencing guidelinesl46 but the Supreme Court held them
constitutional. 147 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, troubled by the disparity between crack
and powder cocaine sentencing, found it odd that crack dealers received harsher
sentences than the powder cocaine distributors who supplied them. 148 Federal appellate
courts strictly enforced the requirement that district judges sentence according to the
guideline range and rarely affirmed deviation from the range. 149 The best opportunity a
defendant had to receive a reduced sentence or a departure from a mandatory minimum
was through assistance to the government in the investigation and prosecution of other
crimes. 150 In other words, due to the harsh realities of strict mandatory minimums and
139. Testimony of Deborah A. Frank, M.D., before the U. S. Sentencing Commission 1-2 (Feb. 25, 2002)
(on file with author).
140. Id. at 1.
141. Id. ("You may recall the initial predictions of catastrophic effects of prenatal cocaine or crack exposure
on newborns including inevitable prematurity, multiple birth defects, 'agonizing withdrawal with catlike cry,'
early death and profound long term disabilities for the survivors. The actual data are quite different."); VAGINS
& MCCURDY, supra note I1, at 5.
142. Morgan & Zimmer, supra note 32, at 152.
143. See Murphy Statement, supra note 95, at 151 ("In any event, sentencing proportionality would be better
achieved by imposing enhanced sentences directly on the small minority of offenders who knowingly distribute
drugs to pregnant women.").
144. See Christine M. Zeivel, Comment, Ex-Post-Booker: Retroactive Application of Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 395, 400-01 (2008).
145. Frank 0. Bowman Ill, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American Sentencing Law and
Hoi It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 367, 424 (2010).
146. Zeivel, supra note 144, at 401.
147. Id.; see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 to
be constitutional and not in violation of the non-delegation principle or the separation of powers principle).
148. See Ellis Cose, Closing the Gap: Obama Could Fix Cocaine Sentencing, NEWSWEEK, July 20, 2009, at
25.
149. Zeivel, supra note 144, at 400-01.
150. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(e) (West 2010) (giving the court the ability to reduce a sentence, based on a
motion by the government, when a defendant provides "substantial assistance in the investigation or
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the lack of judicial discretion, a defendant's only avenue for a reduced sentence was
through offering the government testimony against another person committing a criminal
offense. 15 1 U.S. District Judge Robert Sweet expressed his concern over the inequality in
federal sentencing claiming the unjust disparity "has resulted in Jim Crow justice."152
Defendants attacked the federal crack cocaine sentencing laws, claiming the harsh
treatment of crack cocaine versus powder cocaine unfairly violated their constitutional
rights.153 Courts did not react favorably to defendants challenging the crack-to-powder
ratio, continuing to uphold the crack cocaine laws as constitutional. 154 African American
defendants challenged the 100-1 ratio arguing the 1986 Anti-Drug Act legislation and the
USSC's adoption of its ratio violated equal protection rights through discriminating
against them based on race.155 Because of the difficultiesl56 in proving the Anti-Drug
Act facially discriminated based on a particular race, a classification of strict scrutiny
was inapplicable.157 Thus, the Supreme Court required application of "rational basis"
scrutiny in reviewing equal protection challenges to the sentencing disparity.158
Therefore, the government only needed to prove the purpose of the Anti-Drug Act was to
achieve a legitimate government interest. 159 The government's stated legitimate interest,
fighting drugs and reducing drug abuse, effortlessly satisfied this prong, requiring judges
to "mechanically" reject equal protection challenges. 160 In rejecting a claim that the
sentencing disparity violated due process, one court concluded, "Congress . . . has
chosen to combat . . . [the] effects of crack cocaine on our society, and we believe the
disproportionate sentencing scheme that treats one gram of cocaine base the same as 100
grams of cocaine is rationally related to this purpose." 161 Thus, although the mandatory
guidelines and the harsh sentencing disparity came under criticism, they continued to
govern federal sentencing.162
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.").
151. Adriano Hrvatin, Comment, Unconstitutional Exploitation of Delegated Authority: How to Deter
Prosecutors from Using "Substantial Assistance" to Defeat the Intent of Federal Sentencing Laws, 32 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REv. 117, 142 (2002) ("By providing law enforcement with substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person, a defendant can receive significant leniency from otherwise
applicable guideline ranges and mandatory-minimum penalties. Accordingly, this benefit provides defendants
with a self-serving incentive to testify falsely against others.").
152. VAGINS & McCURDY, supra note 11, at 4 (quoting National War on Drugs Symposium, Panel II: Social
Justice & the War on Drugs (2000) (statement of Hon. Robert Sweet), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/symposium/panel2.html); see also LEVITT & DUBNER,
supra note 93, at 113 (also making a Jim Crow reference).
153. Chanenson & Berman, supra note 62, at 292.
154. Id.
155. David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1303 (1995).
156. See generally Jason A. Gillmer, United States v. Clary: Equal Protection and the Crack Statute, 45 AM.
U. L. REv. 497 (1995) (discussing equal protection and the crack cocaine legislation in the courts).
157. Sklansky, supra note 155, at 1303-04; see also David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A
Comment on Randall Kennedy's "Politics of Distinction, " 83 GEO. L.J. 2547 (1995) (discussing the inequality
associated with denying heightened scrutiny for equal protection reviews by analyzing the intentional
government discrimination requirement necessary for heightened scrutiny).
158. Sklansky, supra note 155, at 1303.
159. Id. at 1304.
160. Id.
161. Chanenson & Berman, supra note 62, at 292 (quoting United States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751, 755
(7th Cir. 1991)).
162. Zeivel, supra note 144, at 401.
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Since the enactment of the 1986 Anti-Drug Act's harsh mandatory minimum
sentencing scheme, federal courts have dissected its statutory language in an effort to
make sense of the sentencing disparity, better explain the rationale behind the policy, and
judicially apply appropriate remedies to the harsh penalty structure.163 A predominant
circuit split evolved regarding the exact meaning of the definition of "cocaine base" as
read in the Anti-Drug Act. 164 Each circuit's interpretation of the meaning of "cocaine
base," although beyond the scope of this article,165 is crucial, as possession of a smaller
amount of "cocaine base" compared to a larger amount of powder cocaine triggers the
much harsher penalties.166 Powder cocaine, as described in this article, is penalized
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) and (B) as it falls into the statutory category of "cocaine,
its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts of isomers." 167 The circuit split
involved courts' alternate definitions of the statute's reference to "cocaine base." 1 68 The
Second, Third, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeal interpret "cocaine base" using a
definition based on the chemical composition of the drug. 169 The Fourth and Seventh
Circuit Courts of Appeal took a "crack-only" approach defining "cocaine base" to mean
only crack cocaine. 170 The Ninth Circuit analyzed and included any form of cocaine base
that was "smokeable" to define "cocaine base." 17 1 Crack cocaine fits into each of the
above categories because "[a]ll crack is cocaine base but not all cocaine base is
crack."172 Consequently, a defendant's sentence can vary dramatically depending on
how a particular sentencing court defines the type of "cocaine base" a defendant
possesses. 173
In 2005, a U.S. Supreme Court decision rendered the guidelines merely advisory,
dramatically changing the role of the mandatory federal sentencing guidelines. 174 In
essence, the holding in United States v. Booker shifted sentencing power from the USSC
to the courts, allowing judges to implement their own crack and powder cocaine
sentencing schemes, if they desired. 17 5 This landmark case involved a defendant
sentenced to 360 months for possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, ten
years longer than the recommended guideline range authorized by the jury verdict. 176In
163. See Beaver, supra note 30, at 2535.
164. Id. at 2535.
165. Id. at 2557-65 (explaining, in detail, each circuit's approach to interpreting the meaning of "cocaine
base" in 21 U.S.C. § 841 (West 2010)).
166. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A) & (B) (West 2010).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Andrew C. Mac Nally, A Functionalist Approach to the Definition of "Cocaine Base" in § 841, 74 U.
CHI. L. REv. 711, 721 (2007) (citing United States v. Jackson, 968 F.2d 158, 162 (2nd Cir. 1992); United States
v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 438, 461-67 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Easter, 981 F. 2d 1549, 1557-58 (10th Cir.
1992)).
170. Id. at 726 (citing United States v. Fisher, 58 F.3d 96 (4th Cir. 1995) and United States v. Edwards, 397
F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2005)).
171. Id. at 731 (citing United States v. Shaw, 936 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1991)).
172. See United States v. Edwards, 397 F.3d 570, 571 (7th Cir. 2005).
173. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A) & (B) (West 2010). See generally Mac Nally supra note 169.
174. See generally United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
175. See Chanenson & Berman, supra note 62, at 293. Of course, this proposition excludes a situation in
which a defendant's conviction has triggered a mandatory minimum. In that case, judges are still obligated by
statute to sentence according to the statutory minimum. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A) & (B) (West 2010).
176. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226, 235.
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reaching this sentence, the judge found that Booker possessed an additional 566 grams of
crack (from the initial 92.5 found by the jury), based on facts and evidence not presented
to the jury. 17 7 The Supreme Court held the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applies
to the federal sentencing guidelines and "requires juries, not judges, to find facts relevant
to sentencing."178 The Court reemphasized that a defendant must admit any fact, or a
jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt any fact necessary to support a sentence
imposed beyond the maximum penalty. 179 Furthermore, because determining a sentence
within a range required judges to consider specific circumstances of an offense and
characteristics of a defendant typically without a jury, such as during a plea bargain, the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was incompatible with mandatory sentencing
guidelines.180 Thus, the Court rendered the guidelines "effectively advisory," requiring
courts to consider the guidelines during sentencing, but "permits the court to tailor the
sentence in light of other statutory concerns."
18 1
The Supreme Court's reference in Booker to "other statutory concerns" directed
courts to consider 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when sentencing.182 This statute provides
numerous factors, including the consideration of federal sentencing guidelines, for courts
to reflect on in achieving a "sufficient, but not greater than necessary" sentence.183 After
Booker, a concern developed over the amount of weight courts should attribute to each of
the factors, including the guidelines, and the appropriate remedy in the event factors
conflicted. 184 Therefore, courts began to diverge in their treatment of the guidelines,
some remaining hesitant to categorically sentence within certain guideline ranges and
others essentially viewing the guidelines as mandatory. 185
In 2007, the Supreme Court clearly indicated that when evaluating the § 3553(a)
factors, judges could account for the disparity in sentencing between crack cocaine and
powder cocaine, and sentence outside of the advisory guideline ranges if they believed a
within-guideline range sentence was "'greater than necessary."'186 Kimbrough v. United
States clarified prior confusion regarding the federal courts' ability to reduce a
defendant's sentence based on a disagreement with the 100-1 ratio. 187 In Kimbrough, the
177. Id. ("The jury never heard any evidence of the additional drug quantity, and the judge found it true by a
preponderance of the evidence. Thus, just as in Blakely, 'the jury's verdict alone does not authorize the
sentence."').
178. Id. at 245.
179. Id. at 244-45 (citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)) (explaining that a sentence imposed
beyond the maximum penalty authorized by facts found by a jury verdict or a guilty plea "must be admitted by
the defendant or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt").
180. Id. at 249-52.
181. Id. at 245.
182. Id. at 245-46 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2004)).
183. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2010).
184. Steven L. Chanenson, Booker on Crack: Sentencing's Latest Gordian Knot, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 551, 569-70 (2006).
185. See id.
186. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007).
187. The decision in Kinbrough abrogated prior circuit decisions that held a district court had no authority to
depart from the 100-1 ratio based on policy disagreements. See United States v. Leatch, 482 F.3d 790 (5th Cir.
2007) (holding a district court did not have the discretion to depart from 100:1 ratio based on a policy
disagreement with the fairness of the ratio); United States v. Johnson, 474 F.3d 515 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding
that a district court does not have the authority to reject the crack-to-powder ratio put in place by Congress);
United States v. Castillo, 460 F.3d 337 (2nd Cir. 2006) (holding a district court cannot reject the 100-1 ratio
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defendant plead guilty to four offenses, including possession with intent to distribute
powder cocaine and possession of more than fifty grams of crack cocaine with intent to
distribute.188 The district court's calculation of Kimbrough's advisory guideline range,
including all four of the charges, resulted in a sentence of 228 to 270 months, or over
nineteen years in prison.189 Notably, if Kimbrough possessed powder cocaine as
opposed to the fifty-six grams of crack cocaine he actually possessed, a guideline range
of 97 to 106 months would have been the appropriate sentence. 190 The district court
disagreed with the range the guidelines recommended under the 100-1 ratio, concluding
the statutory mandatory minimum of 180 months was "clearly long enough" to
accomplish the goals of sentencing. 19 1 The Fourth Circuit vacated the sentence
concluding it was unreasonable for a district court to sentence outside the recommended
guideline range based on policy disagreements with the 100-1 sentencing disparity.192
On review, the Supreme Court considered the extensive USSC reports illustrating
the disproportionate effects the crack-to-powder sentencing disparity created and agreed
with the district court's view that Kimbrough's sentence, 4.5 years below the guideline
range, was reasonable. 193 The Court clarified that the 1986 Anti-Drug Act did not
require post-Booker sentencing courts to adhere to the 100-1 ratio in the absence of a
statutory mandatory minimum. 194 The Court opposed the government's claim that
allowing courts to sentence outside the guidelines based on disagreement with the 100-1
ratio created sentencing "cliffs" 195 and different outcomes depending on the particular
judge's views on the disparity.196 Although courts would experience difficulty in
achieving complete uniformity, this necessary cost resulted from Booker, which made
the guidelines advisory. 197 Ultimately, Kimbrough bestowed courts with more discretion
in crack cocaine sentencing, as the Supreme Court held district judges have the authority
to sentence outside the guideline range. This discretion allows judges to consider "the
nature and circumstances" of each crime and "history and characteristics" of the
based on differing policy grounds); see United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding a
district court's disagreement with the policy set forth by Congress was not a permissible sentencing factor);
United States v. Miller, 450 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding district court's must carry out the legislative
choice of Congress in enacting a 100-1 ratio); see United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding
that a sentencing court does not have the ability to depart from the statutory crack-to-powder ration as that
would result in an unwarranted sentencing disparity); United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2006)
(holding a district court does not have the authority to impose a sentence not using the 100-1 crack-to-powder
ratio based on the disparate treatment between crack and powder cocaine).
188. Kimbrough, 552 U.S at91.
189. Id. at 93.
190. Id.
191. Id. (quoting district court opinion).
192. Id. ("Under Circuit precedent, the Court of Appeals observed, a sentence "outside the guidelines range
is per se unreasonable when it is based on a disagreement with the sentencing disparity for crack and powder
cocaine offenses.").
193. Id. at 109-11.
194. Id. at 102-05.
195. Id. at 88 ("For example, a district court could grant a sizable downward variance to a defendant
convicted of distributing 49 grams of crack, but would be required by the statutory minimum to impose a much
higher sentence for only I additional gram.").
196. Id. at 106-07.
197. Id. at 107-08.
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defendant while simultaneously reflecting their disagreement with the 100-1 disparity.198
The authority of a district court to deviate from the 100-1 crack-to-powder ratio in
the absence of a statutory mandatory minimum became more evident in Spears v. United
States.199 In Spears, the district court not only considered its disagreement with the 100-
1 ratio, but also specifically applied its own 20-1 crack-to-powder ratio when sentencing
the defendant. 200 Using Kimbrough as a platform, the Supreme Court approved the
district court's adoption of a 20-1 ratio explaining, "[a] sentencing judge who is given
the power to reject the [crack-to-powder] disparity . . . must also possess the power to
apply a different ratio which, in his judgment, corrects the disparity."201 The Court
called it "absurd" to reject a sentence outside the advisory guideline range that is not
restricted by a mandatory minimum simply because a judge explicitly stated the alternate
crack-to-powder ratio he applied. 202
With the transition of the USSC sentencing guidelines from mandatory to advisory,
federal courts have more authority to deviate from the harsh penalties associated with the
crack-to-powder sentencing disparity by applying a more appropriate sentence to each
unique set of facts.203 While courts are still required to follow statutory mandatory
minimum sentences, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 represents Congress's significant
attempt to fix the unjust disparity through reduction of the statutory crack-to-powder
ratio from 100-1 to 18-1.204
E. Application ofRetroactive Laws In General
The concept of retroactivity generally refers to the extension of a law's scope and
effect to matters that have already occurred.205 A retroactive law is a legislative act
which "looks backward or contemplates the past, affecting acts or facts that existed
before the act came into effect." 206 The general rule is that newly enacted statutes are to
apply prospectively starting from the statutorily designated date of enactment.207 This
principle of directing newly enacted laws prospectively proscribes procedural fairness, as
it provides an opportunity to learn the law in advance and thus adjust behavior in
accordance with the requirements of the law.208 However, at common law, newly
enacted penal statutes that mitigated previous penalties applied retroactively.2 09
198. Id. at 10-11.
199. See Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009) (holding that a district court has the authority to
categorically disapprove of the 100-1 sentencing ratio, and substitute its own ratio (in this case 20:1) that is
deemed more appropriate).
200. Id. at 842, 844.
201. Id. at 843.
202. Id. at 844-45.
203. See discussion supra Part II (D) (discussing various cases and the evolution of federal cocaine
sentencing including the courts ability to reflect disagreement with the 100-1 crack-to-powder ratio).
204. See discussion infra Part III (A).
205. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1432 (9th ed. 2009).
206. Id. at 1432 ("A retroactive law is not unconstitutional unless it (1) is in the nature of an ex post facto
law or a bill of attainder, (2) impairs the obligation of contracts, (3) divests vested rights, or (4) is
constitutionally forbidden.").
207. 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41:4 (Norman J. Singer ed., 7th ed.).
208. Id.
209. Holiday v. United States, 683 A.2d 61, 66 (D.C. 1996) (citing Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605,
607-08 (1973); see also People v. Oliver, 134 N.E.2d 197, 200 (N.Y. 1956) ("On the other hand, when a
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In the early 1800's, the U.S. Supreme Court stated "[retroactive] laws which do not
impair the obligation of contracts, or partake of the character of ex post facto laws, are
not condemned or forbidden by any part of [the constitution]."210 Furthermore, when a
newly amended or enacted law results in a change that is favorable for a defendant, such
as a reduction in the punishment of a particular crime, the defendant should be able to
benefit from the change.211 In particular, "[t]he retroactive application of a sentencing
statute is permissible as long as the changes are 'procedural' or 'ameliorative."' 2 12 An
ameliorative change benefits a defendant as it "fails to make a statute 'more
[burdensome] than the prior law."' 2 13 For instance, a statute that lessens the previous
punishment for a crime by subjecting children defendants to corrective treatment as
juvenile delinquents instead of charging them as adult criminals is ameliorative. 2 14
Although it seems more logical for Congress to enact laws pertaining to a criminal act
prior to its commission, as one scholar put it, applying ameliorative changes to a law
retroactively may be "better late than never" in order to ensure fairness. 2 15
Congress's bipartisanship in passing ameliorative legislation, such as the Fair Act,
may be a result of the "strong public interest in the smooth functioning of government"
such as making sure the govermnent remains aligned with the current views of
society.2 16 The legislature, as representatives of society, needs to evaluate a statute's
shortcomings and make appropriate amendments in order to better achieve the original
goals of a particular statute. 2 17 Although federal courts consider most legislation to
address only future acts, if the legislature clearly manifests an intention to affect past
laws, retroactive application of laws is appropriate.218 The mitigation of punishment
associated with a criminal act represents society's abandonment of previous perceptions
regarding the proper penalty for committing that crime.219 The passage of ameliorative
legislation, such as the reduction in the penalties for crack cocaine possession, signal the
criminal statute is repealed or a penalty reduced, different considerations are involved.").
210. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. 380, 413 (1829).
211. See Oliver, 134 N.E.2d at 203 ("Whenever the Legislature alters existing law, a certain measure of
inequality is bound to ensue. Where the change is ameliorative and reflects a judgment that the earlier law was
unduly harsh or unjust, a court should not withhold the benefits of the new statute to one tried after its passage,
merely because it is powerless to extend them to those already convicted.").
212. E.g., Knapp v. Cardwell, 513 F. Supp. 4, 18 (D. Ariz. 1980), aff'd, 667 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-94 (1977)).
213. Id.
214. Oliver, 134 N.E.2d at 202.
215. Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 TEX. L. REV. 231, 237 (1927) ("It is not
surprising, therefore, that many such laws have been uniformly sustained while on others there has developed a
conflict of authority.").
216. See Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73
HARv. L. REv. 692, 705 (1960).
217. See id For instance, one of the original goals of the 100-1 crack-to-powder ratio was to prosecute high-
end drug dealers and malor traffickers (also known as kingpins). Unfortunately, the legislation ended up
harshly punishing a large amount of low-level users and traffickers and first time offenders. The Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010 represents an amendment to the statute that better aligns the legislation with the
original goals of drug trafficking prevention. See generally Murphy Statement, supra note 95.
218. Orrego v. 833 W. Buena Joint Venture, 943 F.2d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing Union Pacific R. Co.
v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913)).
219. See S. David Mitchell, In With the New, Out With the Old: Expanding the Scope of Retroactive
Amelioration, 37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 15 (2009).
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realization by society that the criminal conduct warrants a less harsh punishment. 220
Generally, retroactive application of a statute is justified when Congress directly or
impliedly indicates intent for retroactive application, when the new legislation is
ameliorative, or where a defendant reasonably expects the new legislation to apply
retroactively.221 The provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which modify the
Anti-Drug Act of 1986, is predominantly ameliorative in nature and arguably falls into
each of the three categories above. 222
III. WHY THE FAIR SENTENCING ACT OF 2010 REQUIRES RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
A. The Fair Sentencing Act of2010
The Fair Act, a bill Senator Dick Durbin introduced on October 15, 2009,
represented an effort to "restore fairness to federal cocaine sentencing."223 On March 17,
2010, the Senate unanimously passed this bill.224 On July 28, 2010, the House passed the
bill by voice vote, and less than a week later, President Obama signed the bill into
law.225 Attorney General Eric Holder recognized the strong bipartisan leadership of the
Senate Judiciary Committee and expressed his confidence in the Fair Act's ability to
provide "more just[ified] sentencing policies while enhancing the ability of law
enforcement officials to protect our communities from violent and dangerous drug
traffickers." 226 Senator Durbin articulated the need to address the crack-to-powder
sentencing ratio was long overdue, as it represented one of the "greatest injustices in our
war on drugs." 22 7
Although the initial bill recommended complete elimination of the 100-1 crack-to-
powder sentencing disparity, the Senate Judiciary Committee agreed unanimously that a
reduction to an 18-1 ratio was smart and fair.228 In analyzing the effects of the Fair Act,
the USSC predicts the federal prison population will decrease by more than 1,550 people
between 2011 and 2015.229 At a cost of $27,000 a year per prisoner, the Bureau of
Prisons will save an estimated forty-two million during that time span.230 The Fair Act
will affect nearly 3,000 crack cocaine offenders each year and reduce crack sentences by
220. See id.; People v. Oliver, 134 N.E.2d 197, 202 (N.Y. 1956).
221. 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41:4 (Norman J. Singer ed., 7th ed.).
222. See discussion infra Part III (A), (C), and (D).
223. S. 1789: Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill-sl 11-1789 (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
224. Id.
225. Id. The President signed the bill into law on August 3, 2010.
226. Statement of the Attorney General on Passage of the Fair Sentencing Act (July 28, 2010) [hereinafter
Statement of Attorney General] (on file with the Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs).
227. Press Release, United States Senator Dick Durbin, Durbin's Fair Sentencing Act Passed By House, Sent
to President for Signature (July 28, 2010) (on file with Senator Durbin's office).
228. See id.
229. Congressional Budget Office, S. 1789 Cost Estimate 2 (2010) ("Based on this analysis, CBO estimates
that the modified sentences required under the bill would decrease the prison population by 1,550 person-years
over the 2011-2015 period. (A person-year measures the incarceration of one person for a full year.) According
to the Bureau of Prisons, a decrease in the federal prison population of this magnitude would save about
$27,000 per person per year for avoided incarceration time. CBO estimates that the savings from implementing
S. 1789 would total $42 million over the 2011-2015 period.").
230. Id. at 2.
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an average of twenty-seven months. 23 1
The majority of the provisions in the Fair Act have an ameliorative effect resulting
in the lessening of statutory penalties.232 The second section, entitled "Cocaine
Sentencing Disparity Reduction," represents the long awaited departure from the
previous Anti-Drug Act's harsh penalties.233 Under the Anti-Drug Act, possession with
intent to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine triggered the same five-year
mandatory minimum as possession of 500 grams of powder cocaine, which resulted in
the 100-1 crack-to-powder sentencing disparity.234 The Fair Act increases the crack
cocaine possession amount necessary to trigger the five-year mandatory minimum from
five grams to twenty-eight grams.235 In addition, Section Two of the Fair Act increases
the possession amount necessary to trigger the ten-year mandatory minimum from fifty
grams to 280 grams.236 Because of the increased possession amounts necessary to trigger
the mandatory minimums, the sentencing disparity now reflects an 18-1 crack-to-powder
ratio.237 The Fair Act also abolishes the harsh five-year mandatory minimum for simple
possession of crack cocaine.238 The Fair Act increases fines for major drug traffickers
and for offenses involving the import and export of drugs.239 In addition, the Fair Act
allows for sentencing enhancements for a defendant's role in the crime, acts of violence,
and aggravating factors. 2 40
The Fair Act provides the USSC with "emergency authority" to promulgate
amendments that conform the federal sentencing guidelines to reflect the statutory
changes to "achieve consistency with other guideline provisions and applicable law." 24 1
This allows the USSC to integrate the new 18-1 crack-to-powder ratio into the
sentencing guidelines for use in all crack cocaine offenses.242 On October 15, 2010, the
USSC promulgated a temporary amendment, incorporating the Fair Act's mitigating
punishments into the sentencing guidelines.243 The amended guidelines apply to all
231. Press Release, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Impact of S. 1789 The Fair Sentencing Act of
2010 (Aug. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/S1789%/ 20impact%/ 20factsheet%/ 203.pdf.
232. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Star. 2372; see also United States v.
Douglas, 746 F. Supp. 2d 220, 223 (D. Me. 2010) (providing a brief summary of the new law).
233. Fair Sentencing Act §2; see also supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
234. See Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.
235. Fair Sentencing Act § 2. The Fair Act does not alter the possession amount of powder cocaine
necessary to trigger the five-year mandatory minimum. It remains at 500 grams.
236. Id. The Fair Act does not alter the possession amount of powder cocaine necessary to trigger the ten-
year mandatory minimum. It remains at 5,000 grams.
237. 28 grams of crack cocaine triggers the equivalent penalty as 500 grams of powder cocaine (18-1 ratio),
and 280 grams of crack cocaine triggers the equivalent penalty as 5,000 grams of powder cocaine (18-1 ratio).
238. Fair Sentencing Act § 3; Douglas, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 223.
239. Fair Sentencing Act § 4; Douglas, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 223.
240. Fair Sentencing Act §§ 5-7; Douglas, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 223.
241. Id. § 8 (authorizing the USSC to promulgate amendments to the guidelines "as soon as practicable" and
"not later than 90 days" after August 3, 2010).
242. News Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, United States Sentencing Commission Promulgates
Amendment to Implement Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (Oct. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative and PublicAffairs/Newsroom/PressReleases/20101015_Press_Release.pdf.
243. Id. ("The Commission will consider a permanent amendment implementing the Fair Sentencing Act as
part of its work during the coming year and will submit such amendment to Congress no later than May 1,
2011.").
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defendants sentenced after November 1, 2010.244 Furthermore, because the Fair Act only
amends the mandatory minimums Congress previously enacted, the USSC does not have
the ability to make the mandatory minimum changes retroactive.245 However, similar to
the 2008 retroactive application of the crack amendment, the USSC has the power to
make the sentencing guidelines retroactive in the cases not restricted by mandatory
minimums.246 Conversely, for the Fair Act's mandatory minimum amendments to
operate retroactively, courts must interpret Congress's intent in enacting the law to
judicially apply the amendments retroactively, or Congress must pass new legislation
specifically rendering the Fair Act's provisions retroactive.247
Although the Fair Act is straightforward, Congress failed to include any reference
as to what type of defendant can seek relief under the new ameliorative provisions.248
Numerous concerns remain, including whether defendants already in prison under the
previous mandatory minimums should benefit from the Fair Act, or whether the Fair Act
only applies to conduct occurring after the law's enactment.249 In addition, Congress did
not address a defendant convicted under the old harsh statutory framework but not
scheduled for sentencing until after the effective date of the Fair Act.250 In the past,
Congress expressly stated which type of defendant new ameliorative legislation would
effect. 2 51 For example, Congress inserted a provision in the new legislation restricting
application of the repealing statute to a particular type of defendant to prevent judicial
confusion.252 Conversely, in regards to the Fair Act, Congress's ambiguity concerning
retroactive application allows judicial discretion to determine which defendants reap the
benefits of the new Act.253
B. Retroactive Application of Fair Act Does Not Violate Ex Post Facto Clause
Article I of the U.S. Constitution clearly prohibits the passage of ex post facto
laws. 254 Applying laws retroactively only violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if the law
disadvantages the defendant, such as an increased punishment.255 As early as 1798,
Justice Chase recognized that ex post facto violations occurred only when a new law
criminalized a previous innocent act and subsequently punished a defendant for violating
it, or when a subsequent law increased the punishment of a crime previously
244. Id.
245. Press Release, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Frequently Asked Questions About Making
Federal Crack Reforms Retroactive (Nov. 5, 2010), available at
http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/1105100% 20FINAL%/ 20RETROACTIVITY%/ 20FAQ.pdf [hereinafter
Making Reforms Retroactive].
246. See discussion supra Part 11 (B).
247. Making Reforms Retroactive, supra note 245.
248. See Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).
249. United States v. Douglas, 746 F. Supp. 2d 220, 221 (D. Me. 2010).
250. Id.
251. See Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 656 n. 4 (1974) (the repealing statute
states "'[p]rosecutions for any violation of law occurring prior to the effective date of (the Act) shall not be
affected by the repeals or amendments made by (it) . . . or abated by reason thereof'").
252. See id. at 656.
253. See Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Star. 2372 (2010) (failing to address whether the amendments to the
statute apply prospectively only, or whether retroactive application is allowed).
254. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 3; United States v. Douglas, 746 F. Supp. 2d 220, 224 (D. Me. 2010).
255. Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997); Douglas, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 224.
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committed.256 The Supreme Court also noted that laws which "mollifly] the rigor of the
criminal law" present no ex post facto violation. 257
The majority of the provisions in the Fair Act represent ameliorative changes as
they decrease the penalties associated with crack cocaine possession, and therefore do
not present an ex post facto violation.258 Furthermore, in regards to the relationship
between federal sentencing guideline amendments and the Ex Post Facto Clause,
"Congress did not believe that the [] clause would apply to amended sentencing
guidelines." 2 59 Courts agreed with Congress, as long as the defendant was not subject to
an increased punishment.260 The federal sentencing guidelines require a court to use the
sentencing guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, unless the court determines the
sentence will violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, in which case the court should apply the
guidelines in effect at the time the offense was committed. 26 1
C. Judicial Retroactive Application of the Fair Act To Cases Not Yet Final
Under the common law doctrine of abatement, the repeal of a criminal statute or
the mitigation of penalties associated with a crime applied retroactively and terminated
all prosecutions in which a defendant had not reached a finalized conviction. 262 In order
to avoid the termination of pending prosecutions, a legislature needed to specifically
include an express savings clause in the new statute manifesting an intent that the
previous criminal statute apply to all pending prosecutions.263 In the absence of an
express savings clause in the new statute, when a legislature repealed or amended a
statute, the doctrine of abatement essentially characterized the prior statute as "having
never existed."264 Thus, to prevent the abatement of pending prosecutions in situations
where the legislature inadvertently failed to insert an express savings clause, legislatures
began adopting general savings clauses. 265
256. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) (Justice Chase listed four scenarios in which the Ex Post Facto
Clause can be violated: "1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which
was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes
it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of
evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the
offence, in order to convict the offender.").
257. Id. at 391.
258. See discussion supra Part Ill (A) (examining the Fair Act's ameliorative provisions).
259. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IB1.11 cmt. Background (2010); Douglas, 746 F. Supp. 2d
at 224 n.23. A court should apply the sentencing guidelines in effect at the date of sentencing, unless such
guidelines would result in a harsher penalty then previous guidelines in effect at the time the offense was
committed.
260. See sources cited supra note 259.
261. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IBI.11(b) (2010); Douglas, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 229.
262. Comment, Today's Law and Yesterday's Crime: Retroactive Application of Ameliorative Criminal
Legislation, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 120, 121, 123 (1972). The author would also like to thank the Office of the
Federal Defender for providing an abundance of resources and case law regarding crack cocaine sentencing and
retroactivity and its relationship with the savings statute, located on their website,
http://www.fd.org/odstb crackcocaine.htm and the OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL DEFENDER, MODEL LETTER OR
PLEADING ON THE APPLICATION OF THE FAIR SENTENCING ACT TO PENDING CASES WITH OFFENSES
COMMITTED BEFORE AUGUST 3, 2010, at 2 (on file with the author).
263. Mitchell, supra note 219, at 25.
264. Id
265. Today's Law and Yesterday's Crime: Retroactive Application of Ameliorative Criminal Legislation,
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In drafting the Fair Act, Congress included no express clause saving the previous
harsh mandatory minimums for pending prosecutions and no express provision applying
the Fair Act retroactively.266 Presented with this dilemma, courts must determine
Congress's intent and consider the general federal savings statute, which reads:
The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or
extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such
statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such
statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of
sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of
such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. 267
Many courts interpret the language of the general savings statute literally,
indicating intent to apply the general savings statute to prevent retroactivity in cases in
which Congress did not specifically insert a provision providing for retroactivity.268
However, the Fair Act's purpose, restoration of fairness in federal cocaine sentencing,
fails if incarcerated defendants or those awaiting sentencing cannot benefit from the
ameliorative legislation simply because they committed the act prior to the effective date
of the amended statute.269 In 1908, Justice White indicated the general savings statute
should not apply to new legislation when it conflicts with the legislative goals of
Congress.270 Courts reemphasized this concept explaining the general savings statute
was not an "inflexible rule of law" but one of statutory construction "in order to effect
the will and intent of Congress" when determining application to new legislation.271
Various state supreme courts make persuasive and sensible arguments for correctly
applying ameliorative legislation retroactively.272 Similarly, in applying the Fair Act,
federal courts need to conclude the legislative intent behind the new ameliorative
legislation trumps application of the general savings statute.273 For instance, in People v.
supra note 262, at 127 (The adoption of general savings legislation resulted in the "shifting of the legislative
presumption from one of abatement unless otherwise specified to one of non-abatement in the absence of
contrary legislative direction.").
266. The Fair Act includes no express savings clause requiring the pre-amendment statute to continue to
apply to cases in which defendants have not been sentenced. Furthermore, there is no provision expressly
making the Fair Act retroactive. Congress's inaction, purposely or inadvertently, leaves the decision to courts.
See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372.
267. 1 U.S.C. § 109 (2006).
268. See United States v. Carradine, 621 F.3d 575, 580 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that in the absence of an
express retroactive provision in the Fair Act, the general federal savings statute requires the court to apply the
penalties associated with the crime at the time it was committed); Holiday v. United States, 683 A.2d 61, 70-71
(D.C. 1996); see also Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 661 (1974) ("[T]he saving
clause has been held to bar application of ameliorative criminal sentencing laws repealing harsher ones in force
at the time of the commission of an offense.") (internal citations omitted)).
269. See Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 465 (1908) ("[The general savings statute] cannot
justify a disregard of the will of Congress as manifested, either expressly or by necessary implication, in a
subsequent enactment."); OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL DEFENDER, supra note 262, at 5.
270. Great N. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. at 465 (explaining an exception to the application of the general savings
statute when "it results that the legislative mind will be set at naught by giving effect to the [general saving
statute.]"); OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL DEFENDER, supra note 262, at 5.
271. Holiday, 683 A.2d at 103 (Schwelb, J. dissenting) (quoting in part Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205,
217 (1910)) (emphasis omitted).
272. Id. at 67-70 (describing the approaches of various state supreme courts in refusing to apply general
savings statutes when doing so would undermine legislative intent).
273. Id. Federal courts should adopt the various state court approaches regarding how to apply the Fair Act
in the absence of an express retroactive clause in the new legislation.
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Oliver, a fourteen-year-old defendant murdered his brother subjecting him to a statutory
penalty for murder in the first degree.274 Prior to trial, the New York legislature amended
the statute to prohibit the criminal prosecution of children under the age of fifteen,
directing courts to treat children under fifteen only as "delinquents" and not criminals. 275
Although the new ameliorative legislation did not include instructions as to its effect on
prior acts, thus triggering the state's general savings statute, the court rejected its
application.276 The court explained the "very nature of the legislation" and its "general
object" provided a "forceful stamp" that the new ameliorative legislation apply to all
defendants with pending cases, including in Oliver, where the crime was committed
under the pre-amended statute.277
In Oliver, New York's highest court based its reasoning on the concept that
continuing punishment under the old harsh law would contribute "no [legitimate]
purpose other than to satisfy a desire for vengeance." 278 Although the legislature did not
include an express retroactive clause in the ameliorative legislation, similar to Congress
in drafting the Fair Act, the court recognized the legislature's intent in correcting a harsh
and unjustified statute was to render the law more "humane" and fair.279 The Oliver
court viewed ameliorative legislation, which mitigates punishment, as a reflection of the
legislature's renewed efforts to punish criminal acts in accordance with the three main
theories of punishment: "(I)to discourage and act as a deterrent upon future criminal
activity, (2)to confine the offender so that he may not harm society and (3) to correct and
rehabilitate the offender." 280 The court suggested that the continued application of harsh
pre-amendment penalties to defendants with pending cases, once the legislature indicated
an abandonment of those penalties, did not fit into any justifiable theory of
punishment.281 Congress, in passing the Fair Act, corrected a legislative mistake through
mitigation of the harsh penalties associated with crack cocaine trafficking.282 Similar to
the court in Oliver, which recognized the intent of the legislature and the principles of
punishment, federal courts need to look beyond the general savings statute and apply the
Fair Act's provisions to all federal defendants to ensure fairness.283
In Holiday v. United States, the dissenting opinion gives further reasoning for
274. People v. Oliver, 134 N.E.2d 197, 198-99 (N.Y. 1956).
275. Id. at 199.
276. Id. at 202 ("To preserve the criminal penalties previously in force and to inflict them after the law-
making body has so determined and declared would serve no justifiable purpose.").
277. Id.
278. Id. ("Nothing is to be gained by imposing the more severe penalty after such a pronouncement; the
excess in punishment can, by hypothesis, serve no purpose other than to satisfy a desire for vengeance.").
279. Id. at 202.
280. Id. at 201-02.
281. Id. at 202 ("A legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime represents a legislative
judgment that the lesser penalty or the different treatment is sufficient to meet the legitimate ends of the
criminal law.").
282. See Letter from Dick Durbin & Patrick Leahy, United States Sens., to the Honorable Eric Holder,
United States Att'y Gen. (Nov. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/Fair%/ 20Sentencing%/o2OAct%/ 20AG%/ 2OHolder%/ 201etter%/ 201117100%
5B1%5D.pdf (describing the mitigating provisions of the Fair Act and the intended effects on the criminal
justice system).
283. Id. (explaining the sense of urgency behind the legislation and the absurdity that would result if the Fair
Act is not applied to all defendants in which the court has yet to sentence).
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properly overlooking the general savings statute to reflect the intent of the legislature. 284
Multiple defendants convicted of drug offenses were subject to mandatory minimum
penalties that the legislature subsequently repealed prior to sentencing.285 Arguing the
court should apply the new ameliorative penalties to defendants regardless of the general
savings statute, the dissenting judge relied on Supreme Court precedent stressing the
duty of courts to make certain that defendants "are not sent to prison, or kept there,
unless such incarceration clearly and unambiguously reflects the legislative will." 286
Senator Dick Durbin, who introduced the Fair Act legislation, clearly indicated
legislative will when he stated Congress intended the Fair Act's ameliorative provisions
become effective "as soon as possible" to restore fairness to federal cocaine
sentencing.287
In Holiday, the dissenting judge found it difficult to believe that a legislature,
which passed ameliorative legislation to cure an unfair sentencing statute, intended for
judges to use the general saving statute to continue sentencing under the pre-amended
statute simply because the defendants committed the act prior to the effective date of the
amended statute.288 Regardless of whether the legislature included an express retroactive
clause in the new ameliorative legislation, it was "an inevitable inference" that a
legislature's mitigation of the penalties associated with a crime demonstrated its
determination that the lighter punishment was suitable to apply to all cases not yet
final.289 Giving complete deference to the legislature, the dissent explained the reason to
apply ameliorative changes retroactively in light of a general savings statute was to give
effect to the "rational[]" decision of the legislature in not wanting courts to continue to
impose sentences that the legislature deemed "excessive or unfair." 29 0
One of the few federal court's to rule on the retroactive application of the Fair Act
relied on much of the same reasoning as the majority in Oliver and the dissent in
Holiday.291 In United States v. Douglas, the defendant pled guilty to crack cocaine
trafficking and was subject to the pre-amended harsh ten-year mandatory minimum.292
Before the defendant's sentencing, Congress passed the Fair Act, which greatly lessened
the mandatory minimum for the defendant's possession amount from ten to five years.293
The court correctly determined that application of the general savings statute to preserve
the 100-1 crack-to-powder ratio for mandatory minimums would produce inconsistent
284. Holiday v. United States, 683 A.2d 61, 91-104 (D.C. 1996) (Schwelb, J. dissenting) (using state
supreme court precedent to give an in-depth explanation of valid reasons why the court should fail to apply the
general saving statute to new legislation, especially ameliorative, when it conflicts with legislative intent).
285. Id. at 64.
286. Id. at 91-92 (Schwelb, J. dissenting) (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
287. Letter from Dick Durbin & Patrick Leahy, supra note 282.
288. Holiday, 683 A.2d at 95 (Schwelb, J. dissenting).
289. See id. at 96 (quoting In re Estrada, 408 P.2d 948, 951 (Cal. 1965).
290. See id. (explaining the reason for adopting the principles of state supreme courts is obvious). The
dissent opinion also cites United States Supreme Court precedent that suggest the rule of lenity applies to cases
involving statutory ambiguity and potential mandatory minimum sentence. See id. at 99.
291. See United States v. Douglas, 746 F. Supp. 2d 220 (D. Me. 2010). While not directly citing Oliver and
Holiday in the decision, this court's logic was in line with those cases.
292. Id. at 221.
293. Id.
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results with the federal sentencing guidelines.294 The court explained that preserving the
harsh mandatory minimums through the general savings statute would conflict with the
Fair Act's specific requirement that the USSC promulgate emergency amendments
adopting the ameliorative changes of the Fair Act.295 Furthermore, because the USSC
requires courts to use the sentencing guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, this
would result in the amended guidelines reflecting the new 18-1 crack-to-powder ratio,
while the general savings statute preserved the previous 100-1 crack-to-powder ratio for
defendants subject to mandatory minimums.296 Remaining consistent with the federal
sentencing guidelines, the court held the Fair Act's reduced mandatory minimums
applied to all defendants not yet sentenced, even if the criminal conduct occurred prior to
enactment of the Fair Act.297 Not relying on the general savings statute, the court
emphasized "an earlier Congress cannot bind a later Congress," again stressing that
Congress certainly did not want courts to continue imposing excessive and unfair
penalties.298
In rejecting the application of the general savings statute, federal courts need to
adopt the logical and fair approach as the previously discussed courts and give
retroactive effect to every sentencing that comes before them.299 Although the passage
of the Fair Act is a large step forward towards ensuring a fair and consistent cocaine
sentencing policy, failing to apply the lessened mandatory minimums to defendants not
yet sentenced takes a step backward. 3 00 In order to avoid unnecessary litigation and
judicial confusion as to whether courts should apply the Fair Act's changes retroactively
to pending cases, Congress should pass a new bill clearly directing courts to apply the
Fair Act retroactively. 30 1 As the Fair Act passed with unanimous support, surely a bill
introducing a retroactive clause would receive similar support. 302
D. Post-Sentence Application of the Fair Act
Although it is the duty of the courts to interpret the laws the legislature enacts, they
generally do not apply retroactive laws to defendants already incarcerated. 303 This
294. Id. at 228-30 (explaining the problem that the application of the general savings statute will present
when interacting the federal sentencing guidelines).
295. Id. at 228 ("T]he new Guidelines cannot be "conforming" and "achieve consistency" (Congress's
express mandate) if they are based upon statutory minimums that cannot be effective to a host of sentences
over the next five years until the statute of limitations runs on pre-August 3, 2010 conduct.").
296. See id.
297. Id. at231.
298. Id. at 230-31 (In ruling on the application of the general saving statute, the court explained, "I do not
rely upon [the general savings clause] to escape the ramification of what Congress set out to do in 2010.").
299. See discussion supra Part III (C) (examining the reasoning of courts in not applying the general savings
statue).
300. See Statement of Attorney General, supra note 226.
301. See I U.S.C. § 109 (2006) (indicating that Congress can override the general savings statute by simply
inserting a clause stating their intent to make the new legislation retroactive).
302. See S. 1789: Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, supra note 223 (listing the quick legislative history of the
Fair Act).
303. Today's Law and Yesterday's Crime: Retroactive Application of Ameliorative Criminal Legislation,
supra note 262, at 145; see People v. Oliver, 134 N.E.2d 197, 203 (N.Y. 1956) ("It may be well to note that the
construction that we are here according to the amendment cannot be applied in favor of an offender tried and
sentenced to imprisonment before its enactment.") (citing People ex. rel. Downie v. Jackson, 146 N.Y.S.2d 457
(1955).
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presumption against applying ameliorative retroactive changes to defendants with
finalized judgments derives from the policy belief that altering final judgments results in
the court exercising pardoning or clemency powers reserved for the executive branch. 304
However, federal courts allow modification of imprisonment terms in numerous
instances such as a Bureau of Prisons motion for a reduced sentence, a USSC
amendment to the guideline range, or "another statute . . . expressly permit[ting] the
court to do so."305 Retroactive laws are important and powerful tools for Congress. 306
They equip the legislature with the means necessary to achieve "social and political
goals" in an effort to correct and improve old laws. 307
Although courts may apply the ameliorative provisions of the Fair Act
retroactively to defendants not yet sentenced, they generally do not have the ability to
modify final judgments of incarceration unless a statute expressly permits
modification. 308 In addition, because the Fair Act represents Congress's amendments to
the mandatory minimum laws, the USSC cannot make the Fair Act's changes to
mandatory minimums retroactive. 309 Congress is the only entity that can make the Fair
Act retroactive through the passage of new legislation that specifically makes the Fair
Act's provisions applicable to incarcerated defendants. 3 10 Congress, with the help of the
USSC, the Bureau of Prisons, and the courts, can successfully pass a new bill setting up
an efficient procedure for incarcerated defendants to take advantage of the new lighter
penalties. Congress can work closely with the USSC, who successfully made a crack
guideline amendment retroactive in 2008, in determining the best method for using
retroactivity to reduce mandatory minimum penalties for incarcerated defendants. 3 11 As
many have already noted, courts, experienced in dealing with retroactive crack
amendments since 2008, are ready to manage a large amount of sentence reductions
primarily submitted through simple motions that would not overburden the court.3 12
Most importantly, it is absurd to deny incarcerated defendants the benefits of the
lesser penalties when they are the ones who have paid the ultimate price for Congress's
harsh policy.3 13 The President of Families Against Mandatory Minimums was correct in
stating that a court's determination on whether an incarcerated defendant can benefit
from the Fair Act should not depend on an "arbitrary" factor such as when the criminal
304. Today's Law and Yesterday s Crime: Retroactive Application of Ameliorative Criminal Legislation,
supra note 262, at 145.
305. United States v. Goodwyn, 596 F.3d 233, 235 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)).
306. See Jan G. Laitos, Legislative Retroactivty, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 81, 99 (1997).
307. See id.
308. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3582 (c)(B) (West 2010) ("[T]he court may modify an imposed term of imprisonment to
the extent otherwise expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.")
This section must not conflict with any section governing punishments listed in the penalties section of 21
U.S.C. 841(b). In other words, if the mandatory minimum penalty cannot override any other rule of law, then
the § 841(b) will have to be modified to allow for sentence reductions. See 21 U.S.C.A. 841(b) (West 2010).
309. Making Reforms Retroactive, supra note 245.
3 10. Id.
311. See supra discussion Part 11 (b).
312. Harlan Protass & Mark D. Harris, Make New Crack Laii Retroactive, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 27, 2010,
http://www.law.com/jsp/nl/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202472477377&Make-new crack law retroactive&slretu
m=1&hbxlogin=1.
313. See Stewart, supra note 11.
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act took place.314 In the past, courts found it troubling that an incarcerated defendant was
not able to benefit from ameliorative legislation, arguing, "drawing the line at finalized
convictions is no less arbitrary or more fundamentally fair than drawing the line at any
other stage in the criminal process." 3 15 Congress, in passing the Fair Act, lowered the
requisite culpability necessary to trigger mandatory minimums.316 Continuing to punish
a defendant for a degree of culpability that Congress no longer believes is fair does not
find justification under any theory of punishment. 3 17 In addition, Congress can give life
back to thousands of defendants previously sentenced under the harsh disproportionate
sentences. 3 18 Congress has the opportunity to minimize the social costs associated with
incarceration as well as utilize tax dollars for various rehabilitation programs.3 19 It is
meaningless to continue expending tax dollars to keep defendants incarcerated under
mandatory minimums that Congress views as excessive and unfair.320 Two authors from
The National Law Journal said it best, stating, "[n]ow Congress needs to finish the job by
making the new scheme retroactive" as it seems only fair that incarcerated defendants
"should be among the first to receive relief' from Congress's "enlightened perspectives
about punishment." 32 1 Furthermore, application of the Fair Act retroactively to
incarcerated defendants truly accomplishes Congress's goal of restoring fairness in
federal sentencing. 322
IV. CONCLUSION
After over two decades of disproportionately punishing crack cocaine trafficking
much worse than powder cocaine trafficking, Congress reduced the sentencing disparity
to reflect a much fairer penalty.323 The United States Sentencing Commission,
criminologists, and doctors criticized the reasons associated with supporting the harsh
disparity and continuously proved the reasons lacked a scientific and factual basis. 324
The topic resulted in heavy litigation, and the federal courts disagreement with the harsh
sentencing disparity took center stage in a major Supreme Court case.325 The negative
effects of the sentencing disparity had a discriminatory impact, which greatly increased
314. Id.
315. Today's Law and Yesterday s Crime: Retroactive Application of Ameliorative Criminal Legislation,
supra note 262, at 146 (referencing dissenting opinions in cases in which judges found not allowing
ameliorative legislation to apply retroactively to incarcerated defendants violates the principles of justice).
316. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372.
317. See Mitchell, supra note 219, at 43 ("The restriction of ameliorative changes in [denying retroactive
amelioration] is based not upon the degree of culpability but temporality. To deny the application of change
based upon such an arbitrary distinction offends the theories of punishment whether one is a consequentialist or
retributivist.").
318. See Letter from Julie Stewart, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, to the Honorable William K.
Sessions III, Chair, United States Sentencing Comm'n 8-9 (Aug. 16, 2010) (on file with author).
319. See id. at 9.
320. See id. (explaining it costs nearly $26, 000 to incarcerate a defendant in federal prison every year, while
alternatives to incarceration reduce costs but increase opportunities).
321. Protass & Harris, supra note 312.
322. Fair Sentencing Act § preamble.
323. See The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).
324. See discussion supra Part 11 (C). See generally sources cited supra note 60.
325. See discussion supra Part 11 (D). See generally Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
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African American incarceration rates. 326 The Department of Justice is one of many
organizations that supported the revision of cocaine sentencing, recognizing "[p]ublic
trust and confidence [as] essential elements of an effective criminal justice system." 327
The Department of Justice is confident that the passage of the Fair Act promotes trust in
the government's ability to punish in a manner society deems fair and appropriate.328
Although the Fair Act does not specifically allow for application to cases not finally
adjudicated or defendants already incarcerated, the courts and Congress have the ability
to render the Fair Act's mandatory minimum changes retroactive.329 With the court's
correct interpretation of Congress's clear intent behind passing the Fair Act, the general
savings statue does not restrict retroactive application to cases not finally adjudicated. 330
Furthermore, Congress needs to pass new legislation to extend the Fair Act's benefits to
those who have suffered most, those behind bars under the previous unjust sentencing
policy. The success of the USSC's retroactive crack amendment in 2008 proves that
courts have the ability and experience to handle reduced mandatory minimums made
retroactive for defendants in prison.33 1 Otherwise, defendants remain incarcerated under
laws that Congress views as unfair.332 For continued faith and respect in the criminal
justice system, basic fairness requires the government to apply ameliorative changes
retroactively, regardless of when the criminal conduct occurred. 333
-Ryan E. Brungard
326. Unfairness In Federal Cocaine Sentencing, supra note 1, at 97-98 (statement of Marc Mauer)
(discussing crack cocaine and its devastating impact on the African American community).
327. Id. at 31 (statement of Assistant Att'y Gen. Lanny A. Breuer).
328. See id.
329. See discussion supra Part III (C) & (D).
330. See supra Part Ill (C).
331. See source cited supra note 80; Protass & Harris, supra note 312; PRELIMINARY DATA REPORT, supra
note 79.
332. The Fair Act preamble reads, "An Act To restore fairness to Federal cocaine sentencing." Thus,
Congress is attempting to fix a law they believe is unfair. Continuing to punish defendants based on an old
unfair law does not ensure basic equity or fairness. See The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220,
124 Stat. 2372 (2010).
333. See Unfairness In Federal Cocaine Sentencing, supra note 1, at 31 (statement of Assistant Attorney
General Lanny A. Breuer).
* University of Tulsa College of Law, J.D. Candidate, May 2012. The author would like to thank the
editors of the Tulsa Law Review for their guidance in editing this paper, the Office of the Federal Defender for
their website that provided an abundance of resources and case law on sentencing, retroactivity, the savings
statute, etc., and finally, the Families Against Mandatory Minimums foundation for their incredibly resourceful
website.
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